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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, defendant-appellant Combes submit this petition for
rehearing in order to raise certain points the Court's
September 24, 1990 majority opinion (a copy of which is
attached hereto in the Addendum) overlooked or misapprehended.
In particular, the opinion shows that there were genuine issues
of material fact the Court overlooked in determining that, as a
matter of law, plaintiff-appellee Breuer-Harrison's delay in
asserting the claim for recission was not unreasonable or in
bad faith.
Although the Court's opinion purported to construe the
record in the light most favorable to the Combes, the Court
failed to do so.

Instead, the Court weighed competing

evidence, determined the credibility of witnesses, and
generally acted as a finder of fact.

The Court's opinion also

recited direct and circumstantial evidence from which a finder
of fact could reasonably have concluded that Breuer-Harrison*s
delay was unreasonable, and that the pipeline easement was only
a pretext for a decision to rescind based on a failing real
estate market.
The Court's legal analysis also overlooked the
difference between waiver of a contract breach and waiver of a
particular equitable remedy, recission, for that breach.

Also

overlooked was the $15,000 received by Breuer-Harrison on an
attempted sale of the property, which amount should have been
deducted from the amount awarded as recissionary damages.

Upon rehearing, the Combes respectfully urge the Court
to reverse the summary judgment in favor of Breuer-Harrison and
remand for trial on the issues of reasonableness and good
faith.

Alternatively, the Court should direct the District

Court to reduce the recissionary damage award by $15,000.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
FACTUAL ISSUES OF REASONABLENESS AND GOOD FAITH
CREATED BY BREUER-HARRISON'S DELAY IN ASSERTING
THE RECISSION CLAIM.
At page 9 of its opinion, the Court correctly noted
that a summary judgment may be affirmed only if "no genuine
issue of material fact exists,M when viewing "the facts and
. . . the evidence in the -light most favorable to the losing
party" (citations omitted).

In reviewing a summary judgment,

the appellate court is reguired to apply the same standards as
the lower court.
1977).

See, Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah

Accordingly, the court may not resolve conflicts in

evidence or make judgments about the credibility of witnesses
whose demeanor the court has had no opportunity to observe.
See, Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).

Even one

sworn statement is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Id.

The party against whom summary judgment is awarded
must also be given the benefit of all inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

See, Frederick May &

Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962).

Otherwise,

that party is improperly prevented from proving its case by

circumstantial evidence.

See, Petricevich v. Salmon River

Canal Co., Inc., 452 P.2d 362 (Ida. 1969).

Summary judgment

may be affirmed only if reasonable minds could not differ as to
the factual issues presented.

Id.

The Court properly applied these principles in
reversing the summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee
Froerer on the Combes' legal malpractice claims.

However, the

Court failed to apply these principles in affirming the summary
judgment in favor of the Breuer-Harrison recission claims.
A.

Factual Issues Concerning When Breuer-Harrison
Learned of the Pipeline or Easement.

In order to determine whether a delayed claim of
recission has been asserted reasonably and in good faith, the
first issue that must be addressed (and the first issue that
was addressed in the Court's opinion) is the length of the
delay.—/

Obviously, the longer the delay, the less likely it

is to be reasonable.

Here, did Breuer-Harrison wait five years

before rescinding as the dissent concluded or eighteen months

1/

The Court's opinion cites Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123
(Utah 1984) for the proposition that title defects known to
the buyer prior to a purchase of real property may be the
basis for the buyer's claim for recission, where the seller
is obligated to convey title by a warranty deed that does
not exclude the known defects. However, the question
presented here that was not addressed in Bergstrom is: How
long may the buyer wait before asserting that recission
claim? Thus, despite Bergstrom, the factual issue of the
extent of the pre-purchase knowledge of the pipeline or
easement by Breuer-Harrison or its agents remains critical
to this case.

as the majority apparently decided?-'

This is a fact issue

not only upon which reasonable minds could differ, but upon
which reasonable minds on this Court did differ, as evidenced
by the dissenting opinion.
In charging Breuer-Harrison with knowledge from 1983,
rather than from 1979, the majority opinion reversed, the
applicable standard of review, by construing the evidence and
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
Breuer-Harrison, rather than to the Combes.

For example, the

Court's opinion admits at p. 12! that Keil knew of the pipeline
prior to the 1979 purchase by Breuer-Harrison and at p. 2 that
Keil was a partner in the development.

Yet, the Court

concludes that Breuer-Harrison didn't learn of the pipeline
until 1983.

This distinction is meaningless because Keil was

Breuer-Harrison's agent, as was Great Basin Engineering, which
also knew of the pipeline prior to the purchase.

The Court

apparently overlooked the rule that a principal is charged with
the knowledge of its agent.

See, FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen

Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980).
Similarly, the Court's attempt to distinguish
knowledge of the pipeline from knowledge of the easement is
also a distinction without a difference.

2/

All of the proposed

It is not entirely clear what the majority decided on this
issue, since at page 12, the Court finds Breuer-Harrison
learned of the easement in 1983, but on page 13, speaks of
a five-year delay in asserting recission.

subdivision drawings, maps or plats prepared by Great Basin
showed the pipeline or "aqueduct", and Great Basin assumed
there was an easement at least 20-30 feet wide that would have
to be taken into account in developing the property.
Court's opinion at pp. 3-4.

See,

Knowledge of the "waterline" prior

to the purchase certainly gave Breuer-Harrison or its agents a
duty to inquire further to determine the extent of the problem
it might present later.

See, Salt Lake, Garfield & Western

Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d
883 (1955).

Ultimately it was the depth of the pipeline, not

accurately shown by the public records, rather than the width
of the easement, that became the major problem.
Nielson (R. 1420) pp. 101-102.

Deposition of

In essence, at the time of

purchase, Keil, and Great Basin especially, knew as much about
the easement as they would have if it had been excluded from
the warranties of title.
In accepting at face value the deposition testimony of
Breuer, Harrison and their agents concerning knowledge of the
pipeline or eastment, this Court simply assumed they were
truthful, credible witnesses.—y

However, a finder of fact

could reasonably conclude otherwise.

3/

For example, is it

At page 7, n. 2, the Court also addresses the credibility
of Keith Combe. Again, such assessments are for the finder
of fact. Moreover, the issue of when Combe learned of the
pipeline is irrelevant to the issue of when Breuer-Harrison
or its agents learned of it.

credible that a sophisticated real estate agent like Keil would
think that there would be a pipeline without a corresponding
easement?

Pages 79-80 of his deposition (R. 1412) suggest he

assumed there was an easement and understood the ramifications
an easement might present for development.

Both Anderson and

Olsen at Great Basin also assumed there was such an easement,
as the Court pointed out at p. 3 of its opinion.
Also, at page 12 of its opinion, the Court states that
"[t]here is no evidence that prior to executing the contract,
Breuer or Harrison saw the base sheet or any sketches traced
from the base sheet showing the pipeline".

However, there is

at least circumstantial evidence in the record to the
contrary.

See, Deposition of Keil (R. 1412) at pp.23-29,

41-42; Deposition of Anderson (R. 1415) pp. 23-25; Deposition
of Olsen, pp. 22-32, 48.
At page 12 of its opinion, the Court states that
H

[e]ven after exhaustive discovery and deposition testimony,

the evidence does not contradict or cast any doubt on the
developers' testimony" regarding when they knew of the
pipeline.

As shown above, this is simply not the case.

Moreover, this represents the very weighing of evidence and
determinations of credibility that the standard of review
applicable to summary judgment, precludes.

The Court's opinion

itself recites sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence
from which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that
Breuer-Harrison waited five years before deciding to rescind.
The Court simply overlooked the effect this evidence could have

on a finder of fact being asked to determine whether
Breuer-Harrison acted reasonably and in good faith.
B.

Factual Issues Regarding Whether BreuerHarrison Acted Reasonably and in Good Faith
Upon Learning of the Easement.

Even assuming Breuer-Harrison did not learn of the
pipeline or easement until 1983, the Court's opinion at pp. 14
and 15 raises numerous factual issues concerning good faith and
reasonableness that could not properly be resolved by summary
judgment.

Here again, the Court either weighed competing

evidence or ignored reasonable interpretations of the evidence
to which the Combes were entitled.
In finding that, as a matter of law, Breuer-Harrison
acted in good faith, the Court overlooked its own statement at
page 14 to the effect that the pipeline may not have been the
real reason for recission:

"...

[A] plummeting real estate

market may have precipitated B-H's decision to rescind the
contract . . . "

(emphasis added).

In finding that, as a matter

of law, Breuer-Harrison acted reasonably, the Court similarly
overlooked another of its own statements, also on p. 14: ". . .
B-H would have saved both parties considerable expense had it
rescinded the contract immediately . . . "

^4/

(emphasis added).— /

The Court's point that Breuer-Harrison' s delay not only
failed to mitigate its damages, but actually increased both
its and the Combes' damages, is an important one in a
recission case. One of the reasons for requiring recission
to be asserted promptly is that the longer the parties
continue to perform the contract, the harder it becomes to
return them to the pre-contract status quo.

The Court goes on to note, again at p. 14, that,
" . . . it is sound policy to not blindly require a
non-breaching party to rescind immediately . . . ".

However,

the issue is not whether Breuer-Harrison had to act
immediately, but whether its delay was reasonable and in good
faith, which are inherently factual issues.
Schmeck, 390 P.2d 576 (Ariz. 1964).

See, Mahurin v.

Moreover, it it is also

"sound policy" to let a finder of fact hear both sides of the
story, rather than "blindly" accepting one version or the
other, especially in light of the Court's own statements quoted
above.
Also on p. 14, the Court stated:

"The complete impact

of the pipeline easement was not known until further
engineering work was completed and the development cost of the
property became prohibitive in light of the pipeline
easement."

However, there is evidence in the record (referred

to in the Court's opinion at p. 7) that the real reason

the

pipeline became a problem is because of regulations in effect
at the time of purchase, of which Great Basin was aware, that
the Weber Basin Conservancy District began enforcing on!v
later.

There is also evidence in the record (again aLuJcd to

by the Court on p. 14) that if it became cost prohibitive to
configure the project around the pipeline, it was only because
of the "plummeting real estate market."

In rejecting the Combes' estoppel claim at p. 15 of
the opinion, the Court finds that there was no ". . .
admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the [recission]
claim afterwards asserted."

The Court goes on to state that

there is nothing in the record " . . .

suggesting that Nielson

told Keith Combe that they would look only to the title company
and Froerer for any liability for the pipeline and that B-H
would honor the terms of the contract, even with the
easement."

What Nielson, another partner in the project, did

say is as follows:
Q. Do you recall ever having a
conversation with Keith about the lien or
about the easement in particular?
A. I do. We talked a few times about
the problem. And I remember Keith
mentioning that it isn't my problem, you
know, it's Froerer's problem. That's when
our focus of attention — and it never was
on Keith. Because once we saw there on the
title report that it was blatant how it had
been missed, and once we found that out,
then we started all of our focus of
attention went from Keith right to Froerer.
Deposition of Nielson, R. 1420, at p. 44 (emphasis added).
Even Breuer-Harrison admits, at p. 6 of its brief,
that it initially decided to look to Froerer and the title
insurer ATGF rather than the Combes.

Moreover, the Court's

opinion states at p. 8 that "Nielson never told Keith [Combe]
that the development would not proceed because of the
easement."

While the Court speculates about Breuer-Harrison's

motive and intent on p. 15, again, these are factual issues.
See, Hoke v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 375 P.2d 743 (Wash. 1962).
Even if there had been no statements inconsistent with
an intent to rescind, there certainly is evidence of
inconsistent acts and omissions upon which the Combes
detrimentally relied.

Contrary to the Court's statement at

page 6, Keith Combe did not approach Nielson with the new title
report in 1983 for the purpose of obtaining concessions under
the contract.

Combe wanted to pledge his interest in the

contract as security for a loan and needed to know whether
Breuer-Harrison was going forward with the project.
of Nielson (R. 1420) p. 42.

Deposition

As indicated above, Combe was not

told the easement would halt the project,

Instead,

Breuer-Harrison continued to make payments-1' (upon which this
Court has ruled pre-judgment interest must be awarded) and even
requested and obtained two significant amendments to the
purchase agreement after admitted knowledge of the easement.
While, as discussed below, these inconsistent acts
might not estop a damage claim, in an anticipatory breach case,
they certainly constitute a reasonable basis for a finder of

5/

The Court's analysis of the restitutionary damage issue
overlooks the $15,000 received by Breuer-Harrison when it
attempted to sell the property, which amount should have
been credited against the damage award. See the Combes'
opening brief at pp. 14-15 and 44

n n_

fact to find estoppel or laches as to a recission claim.

"A

party cannot retain the fruits of the contract while awaiting
future developments to determine whether it will be more
profitable to affirm or disaffirm."

Porras v. Bass, 665 P.2d

1249, 1251 (Ore. App. 1983).
In sum, there was ample evidence in the record, some
of which the Court overlooked, and some of which the Court
referred to and then proceeded to ignore, creating genuine
issues of material fact concerning whether Breuer-Harrison
acted unreasonably or in bad faith in belatedly asserting the
recission remedy.
II.
THE COURT'S LEGAL ANALYSIS OVERLOOKED THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN WAIVER OF A CONTRACT BREACH AND WAIVER OF
RECISSION AS ONE REMEDY FOR THAT BREACH.
The Court's legal analysis of the waiver issue
overlooks the distinction between a waiver of the alleged
anticipatory breach of contract and a waiver or election of a
particular remedy for the alleged anticipatory breach, in this
case the remedy of recission.

United California Bank v.

Prudential Insurance Co., 681 P.2d 390, 433 (Ariz. App. 1983)
and Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 6S4
P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984), cited by the Court at p. 13, both
involve only the issue of whether the anticipatory breach was
waived.

Neither case involved claims for recission.
This oversight continues on p. 14, where the Court

asserts that attempts to mitigate damages would justify

Breuer-Harrison*s delay in asserting recission.
not the case.

This is simply

At the time Breuer-Harrison learned of the

pipeline or easement, even assuming this occurred in 1983, it
had to make an election, especially since it knew the
encumbrance could not be remedied.

Breuer-Harrison could elect

to affirm the contract, attempt to mitigate its damages, and
sue for damages later if this attempt was unsuccessful, or it
could elect to rescind.
91 (Ore. 1974).

See, Pickinpaugh v. Morton, 519 P.2d

It could not do both.

Moreover, there is

evidence in the record, referred to in the Court's opinion at
p. 7, that Breuer-Harrison made a conscious decision not to
rescind in 1983, upon the advice of one of its partners,
Nielson.
If, as the Court postulated, Breuer-Harrison elected
to mitigate its damages, then it also elected damages as its
remedy, not recission.

By making that election,

Breuer-Harrison may have preserved its right to sue for damages
later, but it waived any right to later assert the inconsistent
remedy of recission.
CONCLUSION
Because recission is an equitable remedy, a finder of
fact must consider all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances in reaching the ultimate decision of whether it
is fair to allow this remedy.

This Court overlooked numerous

facts and circumstances that make recission unfair here.

More

importantly, this Court overlooked that it is not its
prerogative to make this factual inquiry.
The Combes respectfully urge that their petition for
rehearing be granted and that the Breuer-Harrison recission
claims be remanded for trial. At minimum, the recissionary
damage award must be reduced by $15,000.
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Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellants Keith and Evelyn Combe appeal the trial
court's summary judgment for appellees, Breuer-Harrison, Inc.
(B-H), Casper J. Breuer, and William Harrison, against the
Combes for anticipatory repudiation of a real estate contract
entered into by the parties. The Combes also appeal the trial
court's summary judgment dismissing the Combes' cross claims
against appellees Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. (ATGF)
and Robert Froerer. We affirm in part and reverse and remand
in part.
The property in question is an undeveloped parcel of
approximately twenty acres located in south Ogden, Utah. It
was originally part of a farm developed by Keith Combe's
grandfather. In the early 1960s, the Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District (Weber Basin), by condemnation
proceedings, obtained a thirty-foot wide easement on the
property and constructed a water pipeline within the confines
of the easement. Sometime in the 1970s, Keith Combe's mother
divided the property into four parcels, conveying a parcel each
to Keith Combe and his three siblings. One of the parcels
distributed to Keith Combe's siblings was held in a trust
managed by First Security Bank (Bank).
In 1979, Breuer and Harrison, the sole stockholders in
B-H, a California corporation, became interested in purchasing
property in Utah for development projects. They contacted
Steve Keil, an Ogden real estate agent, who showed them several
large parcels of property in the Ogden area. One of the
properties they examined was the property owned by Combe and
his siblings. Keil, Breuer, and Harrison walked across the
Combe property and examined the county plat maps and available
demographic and economic data.
Sometime in August 1979, Breuer and Harrison entered
into an oral agreement with Keil, Bruce Nielson, who owned the
real estate firm where Keil worked, and Duane Bruce, another
agent for the firm. They agreed that Keil, Nielson, and Bruce
would have a twenty-five percent equity interest in the Combe
property after a proposed purchase. The three were to share
with B-H the costs, expenses, and all required payments under
the Combe contract. A "memorandum of understanding" outlining
the terms of the agreement was drafted and signed by all five
individuals sometime in December 1979.

In August 1979, Keil contacted Jay Anderson, owner of
an engineering firm, Great Basin Engineering (GBE), and asked
Anderson to sketch some subdivision layouts of the Combe
property. To assist B-H in determining the suitability of the
Combe property as a residential subdivision, GBE subsequently
performed, prior to B-H's purchase of the property, a variety
of engineering tasks, including extensive soil testing, on-site
ground water analysis, runoff flow analysis, and placement of
road alignment.
Anderson assigned the actual design sketch work to
Charles Olsen, an engineer at GBE. Olsen first prepared a base
sheet by tracing information from a Weber County topography
map. The base sheet showed the property boundaries,
surrounding subdivisions, streets, and a dotted line marked
"Aqueduct,"1 crossing the property diagonally in a northwest
direction. By placing tracing paper over the base sheet, Olsen
prepared several different sketches.
Because of the aqueduct marking, Olsen assumed there
was an easement and asked Anderson the size of the easement,
since Olsen typically included such information on a drawing.
Olsen testified in deposition that Anderson told him the
information was not available, to just go ahead and prepare the
sketches. Olsen made no further attempt to determine the size
of the easement. He did, however, make allowance for the
aqueduct or pipeline, by putting a roadway over the top of it
on the plat maps. He also testified that had he known of the
thirty-foot easement, he would have plotted it on the base
sheet.
Anderson was aware of the pipeline since its
installation on the Combe property in the early 1960s. He
testified in deposition that the aqueduct marking was
originally put on Weber County aerial surveys in 1963. At the
time Keil contacted him in 1979, Anderson believed there was
probably a twenty to thirty-foot easement that belonged to
1. According to Anderson, the marking of "Aqueduct" on the
base sheet was inappropriate since it was really an underground
pipeline. Webster's defines "aqueduct" as a conduit or
artificial channel for conveying water; one for carrying a
large quantity of water which flows by gravitation. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 108 (1986). Webster's
defines "pipeline" as a line of pipe connected to pumps,
valves, and control devices for conveying, in part, liquids.
Id. at 1722.
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Weber Basin, but was unaware of the exact width. Anderson
understood that a house could not be built on the pipeline but
assumed that either a roadway or back lot line could be put on
the pipeline. Prior to B-H's purchase of the Combe property,
Anderson worked primarily with Keil.
From exhaustive testimony, it is clear that in
September 1979, Keil was aware of what he considered a small
waterline which traversed the Combe property. It is also clear
that Keil did not learn of the pipeline easement until 1983.
Keil testified in deposition that his recollection of what he
knew of the waterline in September 1979 was hazy due to it
being a "nonissue." He testified that the biggest concerns in
his discussions with Anderson in the fall of 1979 regarding the
Combe property involved sewage and drainage problems. Although
the exact time is uncertain, sometime in September 1979,
Anderson apparently talked with Keil about the waterline or
pipeline and putting a roadway over it. Keil viewed the
waterline as a minor problem in the development plans, one that
could easily be accomodated by building a road over it to
insure profitability. According to Keil, in 1983 he first
learned of an easement and aqueduct, which he did not relate to
the waterline because in his mind there was a significant size
difference between the two. Anderson testified in deposition
that he told Keil that the pipeline was relatively small
compared to usual Weber Basin standards. He also testified
that there was no way Keil would have known of the thirty-foot
easement in 1979.
On September 19, 1979, a meeting was held with Breuer,
Harrison, Keil, and Olsen in attendance. This was Breuer1s and
Harrison's first contact with GBE. The group reviewed Olsen1s
rough sketches and discussed the number of lots, location of
road alignment, and water treatment, sewage, and drainage
problems. None of those in attendance at the meeting recall
which sketches were analyzed. There is no evidence that the
base sheet showing "AqueductM was shown to Breuer, Harrison, or
Keil. Breuer and Harrison testified in deposition that an
easement was not discussed at the meeting and that the first
they heard of the pipeline and easement was in 1983. Olsen had
no recollection of what was discussed at the meeting. Keil
testified to having no independent recollection of ever talking
with either Breuer or Harrison regarding a waterline or
pipeline either at this meeting or at any time prior to 1983,
but only conjectured that a waterline was probably a topic of
conversation at some time. He specifically testified that he
did not discuss with Breuer or Harrison an easement at any time
prior to 1983.

Sometime in the fall of 1979, Keil contacted Robert E,
Froerer, an Ogden attorney, and asked him to do certain legal
work in connection with a real estate transaction involving
property in Ogden. Froerer prepared the necessary legal
documents, deeds, and exchange agreements, that enabled a
series of property trades between Keith Combe and his siblings
so that Keith Combe and the Bank would end up with the entire
property. Froerer also drafted a preliminary purchase
agreement which was executed by B-H on approximately November
1, 1979. Froerer then prepared a real estate contract for the
Combe property which established a sales price of $410,880 and
required a down payment of $75,000. Beginning on December 31,
1980, and continuing for the next three years, B-H was to make
annual interest-only payments. The balance of the purchase
price was due in full on December 31, 1983.
Paragraph eight of the real estate contract required
the Combes and the Bank to warrant title to the property, to
furnish a title policy, and to convey the property by warranty
deeds. The paragraph was nearly identical to paragraph
fourteen in the preliminary purchase agreement. Paragraph
eight of the contract reads as follows:
Seller warrants that there are no liens
or encumbrances on the property
herein-above described and agrees to
furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense a
title policy showing good and marketable
title in said property (said title policy
to be furnished at the time of the receipt
of down payment from Buyer). Further,
Seller agrees to execute and deliver to
Buyer, or assigns, good and sufficient
warranty deeds covering title to the
above-described property when subdivided
and as paid for in accordance with the
terms hereinabove set out.
Paragraph four required that an escrow account be set
up, that the Combes convey title by warranty deed to an escrow
agent to be named later, and that this agent convey title to
B-H by special warranty deed as payments were made. Paragraph
five, which disclaimed warranties, stated: "The Seller hereby
expressly disclaims any and all warranties and representations,
express or implied, as to the state of the property, its
condition, quality, character, or suitability or
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fitness for any sue [sic], whether existing or contemplated,
matters of zoning, or in other respect.M
Keil testified in deposition that on one occasion
prior to the closing, he went with Keith Combe to the office of
Combe's personal attorney, Paul Kunz. Kunz reviewed documents,
including the preliminary purchase agreement, and made some
changes. Keil further testified that Keith Combe was adamant
about Kunz reviewing the documents prior to Keith signing
anything.
The sale closed on December 29, 1979. Froerer was not
present at the closing, but later obtained B-H's signature on
the real estate contract and the down payment, and forwarded
funds to the Combes and the Bank. Froerer withdrew payment for
his fees for drafting the contracts, and for fees for a title
search and policy, from the sale proceeds. An escrow account
was never established and no preliminary title report was
requested or issued prior to the closing of the sale. Keith
Combe, in deposition, testified that he first learned that
Froerer was going to issue title insurance at the closing.
According to Froerer, the title search was probably started
before the closing. The title policy was, however, not issued
until November 14, 1980. The policy failed to make an
exception for the pipeline easement. The underwriter on the
policy issued by Froerer was ATGF. At the time, Froerer owned
stock in ATGF and regularly researched titles and wrote title
insurance for the company.
After the real estate contract was signed, GBE added
sewers and utilities to the subdivision layout. GBE completed
the final plat in January 1980, which placed a roadway over the
pipeline. In 1980, after a proposed sale of the property to a
third party failed to materialize, the developers continued to
develop their plans for the property, which consisted primarily
of obtaining governmental approval for the subdivision. Most
of the development work was done by Nielson, Bruce, and Keil.
On November 24, 1982, an amendment was executed by the
parties, that gave the developers an additional two years to
pay the principal balance of the purchase price. A second
amendment was executed on January 3, 1983, This amendment
deferred for six months payment of one-half of the $35,000
interest payment which had been due at the end of 1982.
In the spring of 1983. .in the process of negotiating a
concession for himself in the '-tract, Keith Combe visited
Nielson's office, bringing a r w title report with him. The

£

report disclosed several easements that had not been disclosed
on the title report issued by Froerer, including the pipeline
easement. Breuer, Harrison, Nielson, Brian, and Keil all
testified that this was the first time they had heard of the
pipeline easement.2
Anderson testified in deposition that after the
disclosure of the pipeline easement on the Combe title report,
he discovered and communicated to Nielson that Weber Basin was
more rigorously enforcing its pipeline easements. Anderson
further testified that had he known in 1979 of a thirty-foot
easement and the restrictions that are now enforced, he would
have advised Keil that the property would be difficult to
develop, the cost would be high, and that Keil should look for
another piece of ground.
According to Anderson's testimony, the existence of
the thirty-foot easement and its enforced restrictions prohibit
developing the property. Apparently, Breuer and Harrison
wanted to get out of the project after learning of the
easement, but Nielson convinced them to continue developing
ideas to work around the easement. Bingham Engineering
explored and platted the concept of developing the property as
a condominium project. According to Breuer and Nielson, the
placement of houses over the easement would create special
problems if a developer wanted to cross the easement with
utilities; hamper efforts in gaining approval to dig around the
pipeline; place restrictions on the backfill over the pipeline;
require the property owner to make repairs to the pipeline;
render fifteen feet of the property on either side of the
pipeline unusable for anything except vegetation; and will
likely require special bridging or a concrete cover to be
placed over any portion of the pipeline that sits within a
street.

2. The parties dispute as to when the Combes first learned of
the pipeline easement. Breuer, Harrison, and Keil all
testified that at their meeting with Keith Combe in August
1984, Keith Combe mentioned to them that he recalled his father
telling him about the pipeline. Keith Combe testified in
deposition, however, that he never knew there was a pipeline on
the property prior to its disclosure in the 1983 title report.
In trial, Keith Combe admitted recalling his father talking
about the water conservancy district filing a condemnation
action to take a portion of the property for an aqueduct
easement.
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Following disclosure of the easement in the new title
report, Harrison, Breuer, and Nielson contacted Froerer to
determine what he and ATGF intended to do to resolve the
problem. Nielson also met with Keith Combe several times
following the pipeline easement disclosure. Although Keith
Combe was generally aware of the problems the easement
presented, he opined that it was Froerer*s problem and not
his. Nielson never told Keith that the development would not
proceed because of the easement.
In late 1983 or early 1984, the developers hired a new
engineering firm, Bingham Engineering, to obtain "fresh
ideas." The complete impact of the easement on the project was
not known until Bingham Engineering had completed much of its
work and the cost of continuing the project became prohibitive,
particularly in light of disclosures about the width of the
right-of-way and the depth of the pipeline.
Two additional amendments were executed between the
parties in February 1984. The first stated that at least
fifteen acres of the property would be developed as
condominiums and partial payments would be made to the Combes
as each unit was sold. Further, the Combes were required to
subordinate their interest in part of the property so that the
developers could obtain a construction loan. The second
amendment further extended the final payment under the contract
until December 31, 1988, if the developers had paid at least
$120,000 in principal by the end of 1985.
In August 1984, Breuer and Harrison flew to Utah and
for the first time personally met with Keith Combe and raised
the option of rescinding the contract. Keith Combe refused to
reduce the purchase price of the property to reflect its
diminished value because of the easement. Shortly thereafter,
B-H filed suit, seeking to rescind the contract and collect the
money paid to the Combes on the contract.
The Combes filed cross claims against Froerer and
ATGF. In their first cause of action, they sought damages
against Froerer based upon his negligence as an attorney; in
their second cause of action, they sought damages against
Froerer and ATGF based upon the issuance of the title insurance
policy.
The trial court granted B-H's summary judgment motion
against the Combes, ruling that the Combes had committed
anticipatory breach of the warranties of title in the real

estate contract. The trial court later granted summary
judgment against the Combes dismissing their claims against
Froerer and ATGF. A trial was held but was limited to
determining the amount of restitution to be received by B-H
from the Combes. On the day before trial, the trial court
bifurcated B-H's claims against Froerer and ATGF, over the
Combes* objection. The jury which was empanelled in an
advisory capacity, was discharged, and the trial court in a
directed verdict determined the restitutionary damages against
the Combes. The Combes, including Keith's brother, Clair, were
required to refund B-H $236,966.21, plus pay $133,192.64 in
prejudgment interest. The court credited the Combes $7,500 for
the fair rental value of the property as agricultural property.
On appeal, the Combes argue that the trial court erred
in (1) awarding B-H summary judgment on their rescission
claims; (2) summarily disposing of the Combes1 cross claims
against Froerer and ATGF; (3) ordering that B-H's damage claims
against Froerer and ATGF be severed from B-H's claims for
restitutionary damages against the Combes; and (4) calculating
restitutionary damages and offsets.
The standard of review when considering a challenge to
summary judgment is well settled. "A grant of summary judgment
is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.M Ceco v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969
(Utah 1989); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We construe the
facts and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648,
649 (Utah 1986); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). Further, when reviewing conclusions of law on
a challenge to summary judgment, we review those conclusions
for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions. Ceco, 772 P.2d at 969; Bonham v. Morgan,
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah 1989) (per curiam).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

BREUER-HARRISON

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1990) specifies the effect
of a warranty deed as follows:
Such deed when executed as required by
law shall have the effect of a conveyance
in fee simple . . . with covenants from
the grantor . . . that the premises are
free from all encumbrances . . . . Any
exceptions to such covenants may be
briefly inserted in such deed following
the description of the land.
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An 'encumbrance,1 as used in this section, is any right that a
third party holds in land which constitutes a burden or
limitation upon the rights of the fee title holder." Berostrom
v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). The Combes concede
that the pipeline easement is irremediable. MA defect which,
by its nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical
matter is one 'of such a nature that the vendor neither has
title nor in a practical sense any prospect of acquiring it.1"
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 1981) (quoting Davis
v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702, 706 (1970)).
Thus, there is no question that the pipeline easement in this
case constitutes a substantial encumbrance on the fee title to
the property within the meaning of the statute. See Berostrom,
677 P.2d at 1125 n.l (one of the three easements constituting
encumbrances was a thirty-foot easement traversing the property
in favor of the Weber Basin Water Conversancy District, beneath
which lay a thirty-six inch water line); see also Thackeray v.
Kniaht, 57 Utah 21, 192 P. 263, 265 (1920) (an easement for a
pipeline over the premises is an encumbrance).
It is well settled that an action may be maintained
for breach of contract based upon the anticipatory repudiation
by one of the parties to the contract. Hurwitz v. David K.
Richards Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P.2d 794, 796 (1968). An
anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory
contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent to not
render its promised performance when the time fixed for it in
the contract arrives. Ifl. The trial court determined that
because the Combes could not convey unencumbered fee title to
the property to B-H as required by the real estate contract,
the Combes were guilty of anticipatory breach of the contract.
We agree. Notwithstanding that no breach of the covenant
against encumbrances will occur until the deed is actually
delivered,3 it plainly appears that because of the pipeline
easement the Combes would not be able to perform their
contract, constituting an anticipatory repudiation of the real
estate contract.
The trial court correctly determined that rescission
was the appropriate remedy for B-H. The Utah Supreme Court has
clearly established that where an unexcepted encumbrance on a
seller's title is irremediable and, as a consequence, the
seller will not be able to fulfill its contract to convey title
as described in the warranty deed, recission is an appropriate
3. Generally, a vendor is allowed a reasonable time to perfect
title. Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662,
664 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

remedy. Berastrom, 677 P.2d at 1125; Neves, 638 P.2d at 1199;
Thackeray, 192 P. at 266.4
1.

Waiver

The Combes contend, however, that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment since a key unresolved
factual dispute in this case is when B-H learned of the
pipeline and easement. The Combes argue that viewed in the
light most favorable to them, the record establishes that B-H
or their local partners, Keil, Nielson, and Brian, knew of the
pipeline and easement before they executed the contract with
the Combes, since the drawings prepared by B-H's engineers
showed the pipeline and easement. The Combes cite the trial
court's acknowledgement in its order granting summary judgment
that "[t]here is a dispute of fact as to the exact date at
which the buyers became aware of the existence of the easement
and became aware of the existence of the aquaduct [sic]." The
Combes conclude if B-H knew or had notice of the pipeline and
easement prior to execution of the real estate contract, it
waived any rights of rescission for anticipatory breach of
contract. See generally.Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc..
738 P.2d 662, 664 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 77 Am. Jur. 2d
Vendor & Purchaser § 120 (1975) (the rule that a vendee's
notice of encumbrances upon the property does not relieve the
vendor of the duty of removing the encumbrance, where he or she
4. Where there is an anticipatory repudiation, rescission of
the contract is one of three options available to the
non-breaching party in common law as well as under Utah law.
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated these three options as
follows:
1. Treat the entire contract as broken
and sue for damages.
2. Treat the contract as still binding
and wait until the time arrived for its
performance and at such time bring an
action on the contract.
3. Rescind the contract and sue for money
paid or for value of the services or
property furnished.
Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P.2d
794, 796 (1968).
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contracts to convey free of all encumbrances, applies only to
removable encumbrances, not to unremovable encumbrances, such
as building restrictions or restrictions on the use of the
property).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Combes, however, we find no genuine issue of material fact with
regard to when Breuer and Harrison and their local partners
learned of the pipeline and easement. The testimony of Breuer,
Harrison, Nielson, and Bruce all clearly establish that they
did not know of the pipeline or the easement until sometime in
1983. Keil was aware of what he termed a NwaterlineN prior to
the execution of the real estate contract, but considered it
only a minor impediment to the development of the property for
housing units. Keil testified that he never disclosed the
waterline to Breuer or Harrison and that he also did not learn
of the easement until 1983. Even after exhaustive discovery
and deposition testimony, the evidence does not contradict or
cast any doubt on the developers' testimony. Breuer and
Harrison walked across the property but, according to Anderson,
neither the pipeline nor any physical manifestations of the
pipeline were visible to the eye. Although "AqueductM was
marked on the base sheet prepared by Olsen, there was no plat
map or sketch created by GBE prior to 1983 that disclosed the
existence of an easement. There is no evidence that prior to
executing the contract, Breuer or Harrison saw the base sheet
or any sketches traced from the base sheet showing the
pipeline. Anderson's and Olsen*s testimony reinforce our
conclusion that GBE did not fully appreciate the ramifications
of the pipeline easement and never communicated to B-H the
existence of a pipeline easement.
Admittedly, the trial court
found in dispute the exact date that B-H learned of the
pipeline easement. However, because B-H clearly did not learn
of the easement until well after the execution of the contract,
this dispute does not involve a material fact. Because there
is no genuine issue of material fact that B-H lacked knowledge
of the pipeline on or before December 31, 1979, we find that it
did not waive any rights to title without encumbrances when it
executed the contract with the Combes.
Even if B-H had knowledge of the irremediable easement
or, as the dissent postulates, constructive notice under Utah
Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1990), the Combes would still be subject to
the statutory covenant against encumbrances under section
57-1-12. In Berostrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984), the
Utah Supreme Court noted that the unexcepted encumbrances on
appellants' title, which included, as in this case, the Weber
Basin waterline easement, which presumably was duly recorded,
were irremediable. Although the supreme court found that it

was undisputed that respondent had no knowledge or notice of at
least one of the easements, the court stated that M[e]ven if
respondent knew of some of the easements (as claimed by
appellants), mere knowledge of encumbrances of this nature
would not be sufficient to exclude them from the operation of
the statutory covenant against encumbrances." 1^. at 1125.
The Combes assert, however, that even if the
developers did not learn of the pipeline and easement until
1983, their five-year delay in asserting rescission for the
Combes* anticipatory breach raised additional factual issues of
waiver that could not be resolved by summary judgment. The
Combes contend that during this five-year period, B-H
reaffirmed its commitment to the contract by (1) paying annual
interest payments, (2) hiring a new engineering firm to explore
fresh ideas of developing the property, and (3) Nielson telling
Keith Combe that B-H would hold only ATGF and Froerer liable
for the breach and would honor the terms of the contract.
,An original feature of the English doctrine of
anticipatory breach was that a party continuing performance in
the face of an anticipatory repudiation thereby waives the
repudiation and can only sue on a subsequent breach, if any,
occurring at the time when performance is due. 4 Corbin on
Contracts § 981 (1951). The modern rule, however, "is that an
innocent party, confronted with an anticipatory repudiation,
may continue to treat the contract as operable and urge
performance by the repudiating party without waiving any right
to sue for that repudiation." United California Bank v.
Prudential Ins. Co., Etc., 140 Ariz. 238, 681 P.2d 390, 433
(Ct. App. 1983); sag, e,qt, Uplgnfl Inflyg, CPFPt v, Pggifig
Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984); see also 4
Corbin § 981 at 938-39.
The basis for the modern rule, as the Combes point out
in their reply brief, is to give the breaching party the
opportunity to cure the breach before the time for performance
is due. A party that has received a definite repudiation from
the breaching party to the contract should not be penalized for
its efforts to encourage the breaching party to perform its end
of the bargain. United California Bank, 681 P.2d at 433. The
repudiating party has a power of retraction as long as there
has been no substantial change of position by the injured party
and the nonbreaching party's continuing to urge performance may
be properly held to keep this power of retraction alive. 4
Corbin § 981 at 939.
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The Combes contend that the rationale for the modern
approach to anticipatory breach of contracts is inapplicable to
the recission remedy as used in this case. Because the
easement is incurable and they are unable to perform their end
of the bargain, the Combes assert that there was no legal or
rational basis to allow B-H to stall in rescinding the contract
until the contract became unprofitable. In sum, the Combes
argue that the executory real estate contract became no
different than one on which performance had become due at the
moment that B-H discovered the easement. At that point, B-H
should have made an election, which they in effect did, argue
the Combes, by affirming the contract.
The Combes' argument that the nonbreaching party, in
appropriate circumstances, ought to rescind without delay, in
order to be able to mitigate damages, is admittedly
persuasive. See University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29
Utah 2d 1, 504 P.2d 29, 30 (1972) ("where one party definitely
indicates that he cannot or will not perform a condition of a
contract, the other is not required to uselessly abide time,
but may act upon the breached condition. Indeed in appropriate
circumstances he ought to do so to mitigate damages.").
However, even though the pipeline easement was incurable, the
circumstances in this case did not demand immediate rescission
of the contract by B-H. The complete impact of the pipeline
easement was not known until further engineering work was
completed and the development cost of the property became
prohibitive in light of the pipeline easement. Further,
although a plummeting real estate market may have precipitated
B-H's decision to rescind the contract, contrary to the Combes'
representations, the record is clear that B-H did not just sit
on its rights following the disclosure of the easesment. B-H,
through the efforts of Nielson, appropriately sought ways to
mitigate the damage caused by the pipeline by attempting to
develop the property in other ways. Although in hindsight, B-H
would have saved both parties considerable expense had it
rescinded the contract immediately upon disclosure of the
easement, it is sound policy to not blindly require a
non-breaching party to rescind immediately upon discovering the
anticipatory breach. Even where the breach cannot be repaired,
a non-breaching party may appropriately attempt in good faith
to mitigate damages by attempting to honor the contract and
work around problems presented by the breach.
2.

Estoppel/Laches

The Combes also contend that B-H's delay in exercising
its rescission rights raised material factual issues of
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estoppel and laches not properly resolved by summary judgment.
The Combes assert that only when real estate values plummeted
in 1987, did B-H seek rescission. This delay, posit the
Combes, precluded them from reselling the property, prior to
the decline in property values, for an amount that would have
made all parties whole.
We have stated that
[b]efore equitable estoppel may be
applied, three elements must be present:
1) an admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards
asserted; 2) action by the other party on
the faith of such admission, statement, or
act; and 3) injury to such party resulting
from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission,
statement, or act. Successful assertion
of laches requires defendant to establish
that plaintiff unreasonably delayed in
bringing an action and that defendant was
prejudiced by that delay.
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751
P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
We find that the Combes failed to demonstrate a
factual dispute regarding the first element of estoppel: i.e.,
an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim
afterwards asserted. Contrary to the Combes* representation,
we do not find anything in the record of the summary judgment
proceeding suggesting that Nielson told Keith Combe that they
would look only to the title company and Froerer for any
liability for the pipeline and that B-H would honor the terms
of the contract even with the easement. As we have stated,
B-H's delay in exercising its recission rights was due to its
efforts to mitigate damages due to the pipeline and easement,
not because they were relinquishing their later-asserted claim
of recission. Further, since the delay was a reasonable
attempt to work around the easement, we reject the Combes'
laches claim.
3.

Contractual ambiguities

The Combes also argue that the trial court improperly
resolved factual issues created by ambiguities in the real
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estate contract concerning the scope of warranties of title
given by the Combes. The Combes assert that if the unnamed
escrow agent, in accordance with paragraph four of the real
estate contract, was to convey title by special warranty deed
to B-H, such would not cover the pipeline easement created
before the Combes took title. This argument is meritless since
the Combes are clearly obligated under the real estate contract
to provide a deed with no encumbrances on the property and a
special warranty deed could not obviate that requirement. The
Combes also contend that the warranties of title in paragraph
eight conflict with the disclaimer of all warranties in
paragraph five. We find, however, that the "as is" provisions
contained in paragraph five relate to the physical condition of
the property and have nothing to do with warranties of title as
set forth in paragraph eight of the real estate contract.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST FROERER

We next turn to the Combes* argument that factual
issues also barred the summary judgment dismissing the Combes*
cross claims against Froerer. The Combes contend that Froerer
committed legal malpractice by 1) failing to complete the title
work prior to the real estate closing; 2) withholding material
information from the Combes; and 3) by simultaneously
representing another client with conflicting interests.
Traditionally, in a legal malpractice action, the
threshold question is whether an attorney-client relationship
was established. Bergman v. New England Ins. Co., 872 F.2d
672, 674 (5th Cir. 1989); Guillebeau v. Jenkins, 182 Ga. App.
225, 355 S.E.2d 453, 456 (1987). Once this relationship is
proven, the client has the burden of showing two additional
elements: 1) negligence on the part of the attorney, and 2)
that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the
client. See, £-*J9L-# Dunn v. McKav, Burton, McMurrav & Thurman,
584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978); see also Bergman, 872 F.2d at
674; Guillebeau. 355 S.E.2d at 456.
In general, except where an attorney is appointed by a
court, the attorney-client relationship is created by
contract. Franko v. Mitchell, 158 Ariz. 391, 762 P.2d 1345,
1351 (Ct. App. 1988); Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 954, 226
Cal. Rptr. 532, 534 (1986). The contract may be express or
implied from the conduct of the parties. Maroulies bv
Maraulies y. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). The
relationship is proved by showing that the party seeks and
receives the advice of the lawyer in matters pertinent to the
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lawyer's profession. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510, 517
(Colo. 1986) (en banc); Steinbach v. Meyer, 412 N.W.2d 917, 918
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987). Such a showing is subjective in that a
factor in evaluating the relationship is whether the client
thought an attorney-client relationship existed. Matter of
Lieber. 442 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1982); Matter pf Petrie, 154
Ariz. 295, 742 P.2d 796, 801 (1987) (en banc); Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Bosworth, 481 So.2d 567, 571 (La. 1986). However,
a party's belief that an attorney-client relationship exists,
unless reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the
attorney, is not sufficient to create a confidential
attorney-client relationship. Fox, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 535; see
also Guillebeau, 355 S.E.2d at 458 ("An attorney-client
relationship cannot be created unilaterally in the mind of a
would-be client; a reasonable belief is required."). In sum,
M
[i]t is the intent and conduct of the parties which is
critical to the formation of the attorney-client
relationship." Hecht v. Superior Court. 192 Cal. App. 3d 560,
237 Cal. Rptr. 528, 531 (1987).
The Combes assert that Froerer understood that he had
been hired by them to perform several tasks, including 1) the
drafting of all documents for the transfer of parcels among the
Combe siblings, 2) the drafting of preliminary and final real
estate contracts with B-H, 3) conducting a title search, and 4)
procuring the title insurance policy. Keith Combe testified in
deposition that he always assumed Froerer was his attorney
since he was going to be paying him money. Froerer did in fact
pay his fees from the funds delivered to him in payment of the
purchase price due to the Combes.
Froerer claims, however, that he represented the
buyers solely, not the Combes. He counters that merely because
he was paid out of the proceeds of the sale does not establish
an attorney-client relationship. He argues that such practice
is common in real estate transactions and that the argument
could be made that the sale proceeds were actually paid by B-H
since they were the ones who deposited the money for closing.5
5. Froerer also claims that the Combes' claims against him are
barred by the four year statute of limitations under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25 (1987). Since this issue was not presented
first to the trial court for its consideration and resolution,
we will not consider it. See State v. Webb, 760 P.2d 65, 71
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further, we note that a cause of action
for legal malpractice accrues, and the four-year limitation
commences to run, when the act complained of is discovered or,
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been
discovered. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16, 19 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .
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Although payment for legal services may be persuasive
evidence that an attorney-client relationship was established,
Foulke v. Knuck, 162 Ariz. 517, 784 P.2d 723, 726 (Ct. App.
1989), there are exceptions. See, e.g..
Guillebeau, 355 S.E.2d
at 457 (where party obligated herself to pay closing costs
before anyone contacted attorney, she did not pay attorney's
fee in the furtherance of a contract of legal employment and,
therefore, no attorney-client relationship existed). However,
the payment of attorney fees does not by itself determine
whether an attorney-client relationship exists, but is only one
indicia. Hecht, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 530; see also Huddleston v.
State, 259 Ga. 45, 376 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1989) (although the
general test of employment is the fee, the basic question with
regard to an attorney-client relationship is whether advice or
assistance of the attorney is both sought and received).
In reviewing summary judgment, we must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the Combes, the party
opposing summary judgment. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988'. Evidence
presented to the court on this issue consisted mostly of
deposition testimony. Keith Combe testified in deposition that
he perceived the transaction of property trades between himself
and his siblings as part of the sale to B-H and that he was not
aware that Froerer was going to issue title insurance until at
the closing when he learned that Froerer would perform the task
at the request of Keil. The record further shows that the
Combes had no prior contact with Froerer, they at no time
sought Froerer's legal advice either before or after the
closing, and Froerer was not present at the closing. Also,
Keith Combe requested that another attorney, Kunz, review and
make necessary changes in the preliminevv -.iocuments that
Froerer drafted. Evidence supporting
zence of an
attorney-client relationship consists
Keith Combe's
testimony that he thought Froerer w?c -acting as his attorney;
the type of documents prepared, including the transfers among
the Combe siblings; and Froerer*s payment from the sale
proceeds at closing. Viewing this evidence in a light most
favorable to the Combes, we cannot say that there is no genuine
issue of material fact entitling Froerer to summary judgment.
It is only necessary for the nonmoving party to show "facts"
controverting the "facts" asserted by the moving party. Id.
We, therefore, reverse and remand on the factual issue of
whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Froerer
and the Combes. When that fundamental factual issue is
determined, the trial court can proceed accordingly with
respect to this transaction.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

CONTRACTUAL & ABSTRACTOR NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
AGAINST FROERER & ATGF

The Combes next argue that schedule A of the title
insurance policy insures their interests as well as those of
B-H, or was at least ambiguous on this point, rendering the
intent of the parties a question of material fact. Schedule A
states, in pertinent part:
1. The estate or interest in the land
described herein and which is covered by
this policy is: An interest pursuant to
that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated January 9, 1980, by and between
KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN, his wife, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as
Seller, and CASPER J. BREUER, and WILLIAM
M. HARRISON, as Buyer.
2. The estate or interest referred to
herein is at Date of Policy vested in:
Parcels #1 thru #4: Keith P. Combe and
Evelyn Combe
Parcel #5: First Security Bank N.A.,
Trustee, and Keith P. Combe and Evelyn.
The Combes contend that paragraph one refers to the
Combes1 interest, as well as to B-H's interest, since the
Combes retained legal title to the property. If the policy
were intended to insure only B-H, argue the Combes, paragraph
one should have referred only to the "equitable estate" created
by the real estate contract. The Combes also assert that the
language in paragraph two, "estate or interest referred to
herein" includes the Combes and fails to clearly state that
B-Hfs interest only was insured.
"Title insurance is a contract to indemnify the
insured against loss through defects in the insured title or
against liens or encumbrances that may affect the insured title
at the time the policy is issued." Malinak v. Safeco Title
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 661 P.2d 12, 14 (Mont. 1983). The
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question
of law. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d
1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, as we previously noted,
we accord the trial court's interpretation no particular
weight, reviewing its interpretation under a
correction-of-error standard. The mere fact that the parties
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disagree as to the meaning of the language contained in the
policy is not sufficient to create an ambiguity. B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Vinvltech Corp., 711 F.Supp. 1513/ 1517 (D. Ariz.
1989). The first step in our review is to examine the document
in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose, giving
effect to all of its parts. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prods.
Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980); Regional Sales Agency,
Inc., 784 P.2d at 1213.
Following careful review of the title insurance policy
issued by ATGF, we determine that the Combes* assertions are
without merit. The policy clearly insures solely B-H, not the
Combes. The title insurance policy is described throughout as
the "owners" policy. An executory contract of sale converts
the interest of the vendor of the real property to personalty.
Willson v. State Tax Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298,
1300 (1972); Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). The vendee acquires the equitable interest in
the property at the moment the contract is created and is
treated as the owner of the land. Cannefax, 786 P.2d at 1380;
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Thus, viewing the policy in its entirety, we find the
document's purpose clear: to provide title insurance for the
owners of the property, Breuer and Harrison. Therefore, the
trial court properly granted summary judgment for ATGF and
Froerer on the Combes1 claim under the title policy.
The Combes also contend that factual issues precluded
summary judgment of their claim against Froerer and ATGF for
abstractor's negligence. Some jurisdictions have held that a
title insurance company has the liability of an abstractor of
title when it inspects records and prepares title reports.
Culp Contruction Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6
n.3 (1990); Moore vy Title IhSt COt Of Minnesota, 148 Ariz.
408, 714 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Ct. App. 1985); £££, e.g.. White v.
Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 710
P.2d 309, 315 (1985); Malinak v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 661 P.2d 12, 14-15 (Mont. 1983); but see Anderson v.
Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982). However,
the Utah Supreme Court recently adopted the "better-reasoned
approach" which views preliminary title reports and title
insurance commitments as M, no more than a statement of the
terms and conditions upon which the insurer is willing to issue
its title policy. . . .•H Culp Constr., 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at
6 (quoting Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 192 Cal. App. 3d
70, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268 (1987).
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue of tort liability for abstractor
negligence, but cf. Culp Constr. at 6-7; Bush v. Coult, 594
P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1979) (title insurance is in the nature of
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a warranty), the tort of negligent misrepresentation against
third parties to a real estate transaction is clearly
recognized by the court. See Christenson v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983). In Christenson,
the supreme court defined negligent misrepresentation as
follows:
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest
in a transaction, (2) is in a superior
position to know material facts, and (3)
carelessly or negligently makes a false
representation concerning them, (4)
expecting the other party to rely and act
thereon, and (5) the other party
reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in
that transaction, the representor can be
held responsible if the other elements of
fraud are also present.
Id.6 (quoting Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423
P.2d 659, 662 (1967)).
In Culp Construction, the supreme court held that a
title insurance policy does not constitute a representation of
title, but only acts to insure the described title. Since in
this case no preliminary report was requested or issued and the
title policy was not issued until after closing, the Combes did
not rely upon ATGF's 1 alleged representations. The Combes
counter that Froerer s actions led the Combes to believe that
he had already conducted the title search and issued the title
policy, and that they had clear, marketable title to the
property. This representation, however, is unsupported by the
record. Following careful review, we find that since the
Combes did not know or even anticipate that Froerer and ATGF
were going to issue title insurance until the time of closing,
they did not rely on any representation by Froerer or ATGF that
a preliminary report had been issued.
6. The Utah Supreme Court in Christenson determined that a
title insurance company's acknowledgment of a document that
incorrectly indicated that certain properties held in escrow
had unencumbered equity values available as security for
plaintiff amounted to negligent misrepresentation. This case
is distinguishable from Christenson. ATGF does not purport to
act as anything other than a title insurance company, whereas
the title insurance company in Christenson had assumed
additional duties as an escrow agent.
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BIFURCATION OF TRIAL
The Combes next contend that because the bifurcation
of the trial was prejudicial to them, it was an abuse of
discretion, "Severance is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and, absent abuse of such discretion, will not be
upset on appeal." Kino v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975, 976 (Utah
1988); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 21, 42(b). The parties
stipulated to the amount paid by B-H and the trial court
received the stipulation as binding upon the parties.
Consequently, there was only one issue left to be tried: the
amount of restitution to be paid as determined from the fair
market value of the property. Since the Combes' claims against
Froerer and ATGF were irrelevant to the issue of the fair
market rental value of the property, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in bifurcating the claims and cross-claims
between the appellees and ordering separate trials.
CALCULATION OF RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES
We next address the court's verdict on restitutionary
damages. The Combes claim the trial court erred in concluding
that the fair rental value of the property had no relationship
to its fair market value at its highest and best use. The
trial court determined that the highest and best use of the
property in its then present condition was for agricultural
purposes and, therefore, credited the Combes with yearly rent
of $1500. Citing Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 562 (Utah
1985), the Combes insist that, as a matter of law, fair rental
value equals a reasonable return on the market value of the
property as established by the contract price, and is
calculated as the annual interest due on the unpaid balance of
the contract, at the contract rate. According to the Combes'
expert witness testimony, such calculation would bring a
reasonable rate of return of $49,350 per year.
The supreme court in Warner was addressing the trial
court's determination of seller's damages for buyer's breach of
an installment contract, as measured, in part, by the fair
rental value of the property during the period of occupancy.
The goal in Warner in awarding the seller damages for loss of
use of the property was to grant a reasonable return on the
investment. I&. This case, in contrast to Warner, involves
the buyer's election of rescission for seller's breach of a
land purchase contract. Rescission is a restitutionary remedy
which attempts to restore the parties to the status quo to the
extent possible or as demanded by the equities in the case.
Ducran v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986); see also Potter
v. Oster, 426 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Iowa 1988). "In the case of a

rescission, the buyers are entitled to be returned to the
status quo and to recover the payments made on the contract,
less the fair rental value of the premises for the time they
had possession thereof." Ducran, 724 P.2d at 957.
We find that the trial court correctly determined that
the expected rate of return on an investment was an
inapplicable measurement in determining the fair rental value
of the property for the time B-H had possession. That
methodology would preclude restoring the parties to their
positions at the time the contract was executed and would
provide the Combes with a windfall. We also find that since
the use of the property for residential purposes is prohibited
by the pipeline easement problems and it was not so used during
the contract term, the trial court reasonably determined that
the highest and best use of the property in question in its
then present condition was for agricultural purposes. That
determination was amply supported by the evidence and testimony
of B-H's expert witness.
We also reject the Combes' argument that the award of
prejudgment interest is improper because B-H delayed in
exercising its rescission rights. See Nielson v. Droubay, 652
P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982) (a prevailing party who delays
proceedings may not be awarded prejudgment interest). As we
have previously noted, any delay was not unreasonable.
Finally, we agree with the Combes* assertion that the
trial court miscalculated the rate of prejudgment interest
at
10%, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986).7
7.

Section 15-1-1 states in pertinent part:
(1) Except when parties to a lawful
contract agree on a specified rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for
the loan or forebearance of any money,
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per
annum. Nothing in this section may be
construed to in any way affect any penalty
or interest charge which by law applies to
delinquent or other taxes or to any
contract or obligations made before May
14, 1981.

The Combes point out that the statutory interest rate in effect
at the time the contract was executed was at six percent. Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953).
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The contract was executed prior to 1981 and therefore/
prejudgment interest should accrue at 6% per annum, not 10%.
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 109 (Utah
1986). B-H has provided us with no arguments to the contrary.
Therefore, we remand for a determination of the prejudgment
interest amount.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's granting of
summary judgment to B-H on its rescission claim against the
Combes. We also affirm the trial court's determination of the
fair market rental value of the property and the propriety of
awarding prejudment interest. However, we reverse and remand
for recalculation of the prejudgment interest amount at 6% per
cent per annum instead of 10%. We also reverse and remand on
the issue of whether an attorney-client relationship existed
between Froerer and the Combes. If such a relationship is
found, the Combes may proceed with their legal malpractice
claim. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment for
Froerer and ATGF on the contractual and abstractor negligence
claims and the court's bifurcation of claims against Froerer
and ATGF.8
{^<Z&**&c2b>

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I CONCUR:

Nornran H. Jackson^iJudge

8. We have considered appellees' suggestion of mootness and
find it without merit.
OA

ORME, Judge (concurring in the result in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in part):
B-H apparently lacked actual notice at least of the
extent of the waterline easement until well after the purchase
agreement was entered into. Nonetheless, the easement appeared of
record and thus B-H "is properly charged with constructive notice"
of the easement. Callister v. Millstream Assoc, Inc., 738 P.2d
662, 663 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(1)
(1990).
In Callister, which concerned a similar contractual
provision to the effect that title would be conveyed free of all
liens and encumbrances, with no provision made to exempt easements
of record or particular classes of easements, we held that the
buyer's constructive knowledge of the encumbrance was essentially
irrelevant since it nonetheless "had a contractual right to
conveyance of title free and clear of all liens . . . ." 738 P.2d
at 663. Come closing, the seller was unable to clear a 60-unit
restrictive covenant although it succeeded in substituting for
it a more advantageous 75-unit restriction. Id., at 664. This
was not enough. "A 75-unit encumbrance failed to meet the
requirements of the contract and provided grounds for
rescission, just as the 60-unit encumbrance would have done."
Id. We accordingly affirmed the judgment granting rescission.
In Callister, we were urged to reverse in view of the
doctrine "that if the purchaser has notice of encumbrances upon
the property, and the encumbrance is of such a nature that it
could not be removed by the vendor . . . then the purchaser
takes possession subject to the encumbrances." 3J!. at 664
n.6. We held that the authorities relied on by the vendor in
Callister were distinguishable and did not consider the
doctrine further. See id. It is noteworthy, however, that the
restrictive covenant in Callister was not actually "of such a
nature that it could not be removed by the vendor." On the
contrary, it was removed, albeit only on the condition that a
different restriction be substituted. But there is nothing to
suggest that it could not have been removed altogether, given
more successful negotiations with adjacent property owners or
others who had to consent to the change.
The Combes raise a similar argument here and it is
undisputed—apparently in view of the gross unfeasibility
financially and otherwise of rerouting a water district's
deeply buried water line and accompanying easement around the
subject property—that the easement in question cannot be
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removed by the Combes. Although somewhat lukewarm to the
general notion when I authored Callister, see 738 P.2d at 664
n.6, I am now persuaded it makes good sense. If a purchaser
has knowledge of an encumbrance that cannot be removed, and
enters into a contract calling for conveyance free and clear,
the entire contract is an exercise in futility unless the
operative provision be taken to exclude such an encumbrance.
Otherwise, the purchaser has entered into a contract requiring
the vendor to do the impossible, which would be nonsensical.
As a matter of vendor-vendee law, the general
principle seems to be settled. See 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor &
Purchaser § 120 (1975). However, the rule is otherwise in Utah
where a warranty deed has actually been given and the question
about an irremediable encumbrance arises in the context of
whether the warranty provided in Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1990)
has been breached. See Berastrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125
(Utah 1984). For the narrow reason that the contract-in this
case called for delivery of an unrestricted warranty deed, and
it is appropriate to read the statutory warranty into the key
contractual provision,1 I concur that the Combes cannot prevail
under their irremediable encumbrance argument.
Nonetheless, I would reverse the summary judgment in
favor of B-H. I believe the five-year delay in asserting a
rescission right, during which time payments were made and the
contract was twice amended, necessarily poses a material
question of fact: Even if some time to assess the situation
and explore possibilities of mitigation was available to B-H
after "discovery" of the easement, was five years more than the
"reasonable time" the law would permit in which to do so? On
the record before us, I cannot conclude that five years was not
an unreasonable delay.
I concur in the court's disposition of who is insured
under the title policy, but base my conclusion not so much on
the characterization of the term "owner" as on the fact that
the purchase agreement anticipated the Combes procuring
insurance for B-H and the further fact that when both vendor

1. Stated another way, the Combes would have breached their
agreement to deliver an unrestricted warranty deed upon
conveying title subject to the easement and it follows they
were in anticipatory breach of the contract's requirement for a
warranty deed by reason of the easement's existence.
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and purchaser under a real estate contract are intended to be
insured under a "title" policy, both are clearly identified as
insureds, typically with the phrase "as their interests may
appear."
I concur in the court's opinion insofar as it treats the
"abstractor's negligence" claims, the attorney malpractice
claim, the bifurcation issue, and the interest issue.
Finally, even assuming the judgment of rescission should
otherwise be affirmed, I disagree with the court's view of how
to calculate the offset against payments made for B-H's
possession of the property for the years between execution of
the contract and assertion of a right to rescind, which in my
mind leaves B-H with a substantial windfall. I agree with
Professor Dobbs, who suggests that in the usual real estate
restitution case the buyer's claim to interest on the payments
it gets back, and the seller's claim to the fair rental value
of the property while it was detained, should be considered a
"wash." S££ D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.9 at 846 (1973). This
approach would work a much fairer result in this case than
valuing B-H's use of the property at agricultural rental rates,
not only because the parties' contract fixes a reliable measure
of its total value (and thus of an imputed rental value) at a
much higher rate, but also because B-H kept the property tied
up for so many years during which the Combes were precluded
from marketing the property to other buyers. The restitution
decreed in this case does not merely make B-H whole; it gives
it a hefty profit.

Gregory^. Orme, Judge
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